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Constitutionally Compromised Democracy:
The United States District Clause, Its




On September 17, 1787, the United States Constitution was submitted
for approval to the Congress of the Confederation and, subsequently, for
ratification by the American States.1 This constitution was a political
phenomenon: For the first time in history, an entire nation would be given
the power-through popular ratification-to decide what form of
government would rule over them. 2 At its core, the constitution was a hybrid
instrument, both affirming fundamental positivist laws and serving as a
practical framework-an instruction manual framing government branches,
establishing checks and balances, and listing the specific enumerated powers
of a new federal government that would unite the American States into a
single, cohesive nation.3
Yet, the Constitution remained uncharacteristically ambiguous
regarding where this new federal government would reside.4 The uncertainty
arose from Article I, section 8, clause 17, referring to powers reserved to the
federal government's legislative branch:
* Bradley Raboin is a graduate of Pepperdine University's School of Law and the London
School of Economics; presently, he is a practicing civil litigation attorney in California. He would
like to thank his father, Mike, for inspiring his love of constitutional law through endless hours of
The History Channel@.
1. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION 3 (2005).
2. Id. at 7-8.
3. Suzanna Sherry, The Founder's Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1127, 1147,
1154 (1987).
4. See generally Allan Erbsen, Constitutional Spaces, 95 MINN. L. REv. 1168, 1208-10
(2011); Frank Sprigg Perry, The State of Columbia, 9 GEO. L.J. 13, 13 (1921).
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[The Congress shall have the power] [t]o exercise exclusive
Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding
ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the
Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the
United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased
by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall
be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and
other needful Buildings . . .
Commonly referred to as the District Clause, it clearly authorized the
creation of a limited territory as the physical residence of the federal
government.6 However, the clause also explicitly restricted the federal
territory in size, very specifically decreeing the area be "not exceeding ten
Miles square." 7 This innocuous limitation remains a mysterious and wholly
underappreciated aspect of the U.S. Constitution.
Indeed, Part I of this Article contends that the District Clause's ten miles
square limit was neither absurd nor arbitrary, instead representing one of the
most important compromises in American constitutional history. The
District Clause was the consequence of a gamble between the two
predominate political ideologies of the time-Federalists and Anti-
Federalists.8 While Federalists supported a Constitution creating a strong
and centralized national government, their Anti-Federalist counterparts
advocated state sovereignty and accordingly wanted the Constitution to limit
the emerging federal bureaucracy.9 The result of these conflicting visions
for postrevolution America poignantly manifested within the District Clause;
ultimately, Federalists and Anti-Federalists alike believed the clause would
serve their ultimate constitutional goals. 0
Federalists, hoping the district would be the backbone of a large and
powerful national government, approved the clause because of its potentially
massive size allowance and the express grant of exclusive federal
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
8. "Federalist" and "Anti-Federalist," despite their somewhat ambiguous historical
meaning, refer here to the two clearly divergent lines of thought-those supporting an expansive
federal government and those supporting state sovereignty-during the constitutional convention
and ratification debates. See, e.g., DAVID WOOTTON, THE ESSENTIAL FEDERALIST AND ANTI-
FEDERALIST PAPERS 43 (2003).
9. Akhil Reed Amar, Anti-Federalists, the Federalist Papers, and the Big Argument for
Union, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 111, 111 (1993); SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS 11
(1999).
10. See infra Part I(B).
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jurisdiction within the seat of government." Anti-Federalists, intending to
use the district as a constitutional barrier against unfettered federal
expansion, also approved the clause because they felt it was inherently
subject to a series of safeguards serving to check the powers of that national
government. 12
Ultimately, however, it quickly became clear that Anti-Federalists were
on the losing end of this constitutional gamble. Part II discusses this failure
by reviewing the historical creation of the federal district as a pillar on which
a massive federal territory-and with it an increasingly powerful federal
government-firmly rested. 13
Yet, the most dramatic consequence of the District Clause compromise
is also one of the great constitutional contradictions in modern democratic
history and evidences a failure of both Federalist and Anti-Federalist
ideology. Part III investigates this persisting problem-namely, that due to
the language of the clause and subsequent judicial interpretation, residents
living in the American capital have no representation in the federal
government that shares their physical home. 14 Incredibly, the very district
created to house a government "for the people, of the people, and by the
people," does not even allow the people residing therein to partake in that
government.15 As calls for statehood in the district persist, the time has come
for a reevaluation of how this disenfranchisement occurred, and how it can
be addressed. 16
I. Constitutional Compromises: The District Clause
A. The Constitutional Seat of Government
Under the Articles of Confederation-the first attempt to unite the
independent and sovereign American States under a national government-
11. See infra notes 26-47 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 48-61 and accompanying text.
13. See infra Part II.
14. Peter Raven-Hansen, Congressional Representation for the District of Columbia: A
Constitutional Analysis, 12 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 167, 167 (1974-75); Perry, supra note 4, at 13;
EUGENE BOYD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33830 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA VOTING
REPRESENTATION IN CONGRESS: AN ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS; James Raskin,
Democratic Capital: A Voting Rights Surge in Washington Could Strengthen the Constitution for
Everyone, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 47, 47-48 (2014).
15. President Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863). Though not a
founding father, President Lincoln's famous understanding of American democracy would
certainly have resonated with those Founders.
16. See infra Part III (discussing the ongoing arguments for district statehood and how
representation in the Federal capital may be best addressed).
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the Congress of the Confederation was constantly on the move.1 7 In the eight
years of its existence, this national legislative body convened in
Philadelphia, Princeton, Annapolis, Trenton, and New York City.18
Although discussions regarding a permanent location were raised in 1783-
and Congress actually approved of a plan for two capitals, one located on the
Potomac and another on the Delaware River-the states refused this
arrangement. 19
When representatives were invited to Philadelphia in 1787 to rework
the Articles of Confederation, it was hardly surprising that the convention
included consideration of a seat of government-an issue at the center of
political consideration since the Revolutionary War.20 Following victory
over Great Britain, it was generally agreed that if a unified American nation
was to emerge, a new national government-complete with a permanent
residence-was needed.2 1
Yet, while the constitutional convention-at which the actual document
was debated and authored-was ripe with intense bickering, there is little
evidence of prolonged debate over the seat of government.22 In fact, James
Madison would later recall that the convention agreed to the District Clause
"nem: con: [or, of one mind, and without dissent]."23 Seemingly
counterintuitive that such an important, divisive aspect of the Constitution
would garner so little discussion, this fact only further evidences the
bipartisan confidence of Federalists and Anti-Federalists alike that the clause
would serve their ultimate vision of the future federal government. At the
core of each party's confidence in the District Clause was the ten miles
24
square limitation.
17. Mark S. Scarberry, Historical Considerations and Congressional Representation for the
District of Columbia: Constitutionality of the D.C. House Voting Rights Bill in Light of Section
Two of the Fourteenth Amendment and the History of the Creation of the District, 60 AL. L. REV.,
783, 866-70 (2009).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 873.
20. Id. at 869.
21. AMAR, supra note 1, at 111-12 (The District Clause determined the permanent seat of
government, unlike in Britain, where the King could require the national legislature to convene
when and where he wished.).
22. JOSEPH B. VARNUM, JR., THE SEAT OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 4 (2 ed.
1854); MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 170 (1913);
KENNETH R. BOWLING, THE CREATION OF WASHINGTON, D.C.: THE IDEA AND LOCATION OF THE
AMERICAN CAPITAL76 (1991).
23. JAMES MADISON, DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 512-13 (2007)
[hereinafter DEBATES].
24. See infra Part I(C).
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B. Ideologies Underlying the Compromise: Federalists and Anti-Federalists
The task of creating this new government-and the Constitution that
would embody the nascent nation-fell to the leaders of America's
revolutionary resistance. Now standing at the forefront as representatives of
their respective states, these "founding fathers" fell into two political factions
defined by their divergent approach to both the role of the federal
government and the purpose of the emerging Constitution-the Federalists
and the Anti-Federalists.2 5
Federalists supported a strong, centralized U.S. government with a
permanent seat to consolidate and preserve its stability and power, expressly
provided for in the Constitution.26 History, Federalists argued, clearly
evidenced the need for a constitutional guarantee of a permanent federal
district. 27 Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress typically met in
Philadelphia. 28  However, Philadelphia was not the official seat of
government and Congress had no actual jurisdiction or military presence
within the city.29  As a result, Pennsylvania was expected to provide
protection to this national government body.30 A sensible arrangement in
theory, it would prove an utter failure in reality.
In July 1783, several hundred Continental Army soldiers stationed
around Philadelphia sent a message to Congress demanding payment for their
service during the Revolutionary War.31 Although the disgruntled soldiers had
threatened action should their demands be ignored, Congress was in no
financial position to accede to the requests for immediate recompense.32 The
next day, another group of Continental soldiers vacated their posts in Lancaster
and joined with the mob already forming at the Philadelphia city barracks. 33
Together, this group seized effective control over the city weapons and
munitions depots.34 When the band marched on Independence Hall, Congress
called on the State governor to provide protection and repel the uprising.35
25. CORNELL, supra note 9, at 1; BOWLING, supra note 22, at ix.
26. CORNELL, supra note 9, at 1; BOWLING, supra note 22, at ix.
27. See THE FEDERALIST No. 43 at 288-290 (James Madison) (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph
Learner eds., 1987).
28. Scarberry, supra note 17, at 870-71.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 871-72.
31. Jonathan Turley, Too Clever by Half: The Unconstitutionality of Partial Representation
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However, the Pennsylvania Executive Council refused to provide any aid.36
Consequently, Congress was forced to secretly evacuate Philadelphia, fleeing
to Princeton in nearby New Jersey.37
Memory of this incident-deemed the "Philadelphia Mutiny"-was
invoked repeatedly by Federalists during the constitutional convention as
justification for the District Clause.38 They continued making this argument
during subsequent ratification debates across the nation. 39  In Virginia,
Federalists implored their fellow delegates not to forget that "disgraceful
insult which Congress received some years ago,"4 0 while in Massachusetts
Federalists similarly reminded the assembly that the failure to provide a
permanent seat of government had previously forced Congress to flee
"because they were not protected by the authority of the state in which they
",41
were then sitting. Ultimately, Federalists believed the events in
Philadelphia provided sufficient impetus for their argument that the
Constitution needed to expressly provide for a permanent seat of government
where federal authorities would have complete jurisdiction to maintain and
protect themselves. 42
Federalists also argued that the district needed to be large enough that
it could function independent of any individual State.43 Staunch Federalists
like Madison were adamant that the district was to be a distinct territory, not
subject to the laws and jurisdictional influences of the State from which it
36. Turley, supra note 31.
37. Turley, supra note 31.
38. Turley, supra note 31, at 311 ("[w]hen the framers gathered in Philadelphia in the summer
of 1787 to draft a new constitution, the flight from that city five years before was still prominent in
their minds"); Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution 3 §§ 1212-22 (1873), in 3 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 236 (Doc. 22) (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
39. Debate in North Carolina Ratifying Convention, 30 July 1788, in 3 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION 225 (Doc. 8) [hereinafter NC Convention] ("[d]o we not all remember that, in the
year 1783, a band of soldiers went and insulted Congress? The sovereignty of the United States
was treated with indignity. They applied for protection to the state they resided in, but could obtain
none. It is to be hoped such a disgraceful scene will never happen again; but that, for the future,
the national government will be able to protect itself.").
40. Debate in Virginia Ratifying Convention, 16 June 1788, in 3 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION 222 (Doc. 6) [hereinafter Virginia Convention].
41. Debate in Massachusetts Ratifying Convention, 24 January 1788, in 3 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION 219 (Doc. 4) [hereinafter Massachusetts Convention].
42. VARNUM, JR., supra note 22, at 7 ("it was probably owing to the recent disturbance
[referring to Philadelphia], that the subject of a permanent Seat of Government was now taken up,
and continued to be, at intervals, the subject of discussion up to the formation of the Constitution");
Federal Farmer No. 18, 25 January 1788, in 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 220 (Doc. 5)
[hereinafter Federal Farmer No. 18] (". . . and it is not improbable, that the sudden retreat of
congress from Philadelphia, first gave rise to [the calls for an exclusive seat of federal
government]").
43. Perry, supra note 4, at 14; Scarberry, supra note 17, at 870-71.
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would be geographically formed.t During the ratifying debates, he
memorably opined:
The indispensable necessity of compleat authority at the seat of
Government carries its own evidence with it ... [w]ithout it, not only
the public authority might be insulted and its proceedings be
interrupted, with impunity; but a dependence of the members of the
general Government, on the State comprehending the seat of
Government for protection in the exercise of their duty, might bring
on the national councils an imputation of awe or influence, equally
dishonorable to the Government, and dissatisfactory to the other
members of the confederacy. 45
By allowing for a large, independent district, Federalists hoped that the
national government would remain insulated from such state interference
and the district would become a haven where the federal bureaucracy could
exercise its powers, confer amongst its branches, and address the
international relations of the United States. 46 It was yet another lesson
Federalists had taken to heart following the Continental Congress' temporary
residence in Philadelphia, where the federal assembly was subject to the
unending interference of local politicians seeking to influence and curry
favor with federal authorities.47
Anti-Federalists, meanwhile, were wary of a strong federal government
that could threaten the sovereignty of the individual states and wanted the
Constitution to effectively check the expansion of this new national entity.48
They feared, above all else, the "centralization of power in the national
44. THE FEDERALIST No. 43 at 219 (James Madison) (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987).
45. Id.
46. Virginia Convention, supra note 40, at 224 ("Congress shall exclusively legislate [in the
seat of government], in order to preserve the police of the place and their own personal
independence, that they may not be overawed or insulted, and of course to preserve them in
opposition to any attempt by the state where it shall be."). St. George Tucker, Blackstone's
Commentaries 2 76-78 (1803), in 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 229 (Doc. 11) ("I agree with
the author of the Federalist, that a complete authority at the seat of government was necessary to
secure the public authority from insult, and it's proceedings from interruption.").
47. Scarberry, supra note 17, at 870-71. In 1775 there were complaints of interference by
Philadelphians and considerations of relocating. Id. Then, by 1777 "the Continental Congress and
the Pennsylvania Assembly were at odds, with members of Congress continuing to resent attempts
by Philadelphians to influence Congress [and] in 1778 and 1779, there were continuing
jurisdictional disputes, and Philadelphia became '[t]he nearest equivalent in the United States to
revolutionary Paris of the 1790's."' Id.
48. Cecelia M. Kenyon, Men of Little Faith: The Anti-Federalists on the Nature of
Representative Government, 12 WM. & MARY Q. 3, 6 (1955).
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government,"4 9 and continued to advocate a revision of the Articles of
Confederation. 0 Others conceded that while a new Constitution was needed,
the spirit of State sovereignty should remain the cornerstone of the new
political regime.51  Anti-Federalists fought vigorously-both in the
constitutional convention and subsequent ratification-to promote a limited
federal government whose powers remained constrained by strong,
autonomous, and independent State governments.52
Consequently, Anti-Federalists considered the seat of government
wrought with danger-such an exclusive territory serving as the foundation
from which the new federal government could build its power and influence,
ultimately subsuming the individual states, and destroying their
sovereignty.53 They feared an excessively large federal government would
inevitably degrade into a "consolidated republic that would deteriorate into
monarchy or despotism." 54 Ultimately, Anti-Federalists "did not want to
exchange the government at London for the government at Philadelphia."5 5
Another Anti-Federalist concern was that the federal district would
inevitably grow and, before long, consume a vast part of the nation.5 6 This
worry stemmed from the expectation that Congress would invariably grant
special privileges and commercial advantages to district inhabitants. These
individuals would apparently be exempt from state laws, having all judicial
matters heard by federal courts alone.58  The potential insulation of the
district population and its affairs from all State jurisdiction would, Anti-
Federalists feared, result in the almost complete authority of the federal
judiciary in many critical commercial areas. 59 Anti-Federalist "suspicion of
centralized authority" and what they viewed as its inevitably antirepublican
49. Kenyon, supra note 48, at 6; Amar, supra note 9, at 111-12.
50. See RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 402 (2009).
51. Id. at 402.
52. Kenyon, supra note 48, at 25-26.
53. FEDERALISTS AND ANTIFEDERALISTS: THE DEBATE OVER THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 3-4 (John Kaminski & Richard Leffler eds., 1998) [hereinafter THE DEBATE OVER
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION]. Some Anti-Federalists even denied "a single America
people existed." CORNELL, supra note 9, at 63.
54. Scarberry, supra note 17, at 870-71.
55. Scarberry, supra note 17, at 870.
56. Scarberry, supra note 17, at 883.
57. See Virginia Convention, supra note 40, at 222 ("this district would be the favorite of the
generality, and that it would be possible for them to give exclusive privileges of commerce to those
residing within it. . .").
58. Federal Farmer No. 18, supra note 42, at 220 ("[t]he inhabitants of the federal city and
places, will be as much exempt from the laws and controul of the state governments, as the people
of Canada or Nova Scotia. . .").
59. Federal Farmer No. 18, supra note 42, at 220.
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consequences, defined their approach to the District Clause and the
Constitution generally.60
C. Terms of the Compromise: "not exceeding ten Miles square"
Federalist and Anti-Federalist ideologies "defined the terms of the
[constitutional] debate" and "became the sources that later generations
would turn to when seeking to understand the meaning of the Constitution." 61
Yet, despite their diametrically opposed expectations for the new
constitution, both approved of the District Clause with little debate.62 While
Federalists were satisfied the clause would ensure a strong and powerful
federal government, Anti-Federalists equally believed it would effectively
limit that new, unified American regime.63 The reason for their mutual
confidence was the five-word limitation at the beginning of the clause: "not
exceeding ten Miles square."64
While Anti-Federalists were wary of any centralized power, they were
also politically realistic, recognizing that a postrevolution federal
government, and seat to house it, was inevitable.6 5 Nonetheless, they
remained "united in their desire to put more checks on the new government"
and viewed the District Clause as a perfect constitutional mechanism through
which to accomplish this.66  It was in this inhibitory spirit that Anti-
Federalists viewed the District Clause, which they believed contained a
series of powerful limitations inherently restricting the growth of the new
federal government.67
The first of these Anti-Federalist checks lay in the discretionary nature
of the clause. Clearly, it authorized the establishment of an actual place
where the federal government could operate. 68  However, the clause is
60. CORNELL, supra note 9, at 1; BOWLING, supra note 22, at 23.
61. CORNELL, supra note 9, at 19.
62. ESTABLISHING CONGRESS: THE REMOVAL TO WASHINGTON D.C., AND THE ELECTION
OF 1800 40 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Donald R. Kennon eds., 2005) [hereinafter ESTABLISHING
CONGRESS]; BOWLING, supra note 22, at 76.
63. CORNELL, supra note 9, at 1; BOWLING, supra note 22, at ix; Kenyon, supra note 48, at 6.
64. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
65. BEEMAN, supra note 50, at 402 ("[w]ith few exceptions, most of them [Anti-Federalists]
had given up on an outright rejection of the Constitution").
66. See Kenyon, supra note 48, at 25-26.
67. See generally CORNELL, supra note 9, at 1-2; BOWLING, supra note 22, at 23-24.
68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17; William Tindall, Naming the Seat of Government of the
United States: A Legislative Paradox, 23 RECORDS OF THE COLUM. HIST. Soc'Y 10 (1920).
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entirely elective-arguably, it doesn't even require the creation of a federal
district at all.69
Secondly, the clause was widely understood as creating only a
maximum area, not a required size, for the new federal government seat. 0
Although the one hundred square mile allowance was massive by eighteenth
century standards, it was a constitutional limit all the same, guaranteeing the
district would remain limited to a fraction of the then-existing U.S.
landmass. 71 Further, Anti-Federalists believed that the potential size allowed
under the clause was unthinkable; such a large area was totally unnecessary
for the new, relatively small federal government and they probably never
imagined the district would require this maximum allowance.72 Finally, the
fact that the District Clause authorized, but did not require, this excessive
size, allowed Anti-Federalists to argue against the clause on the basis that all
one-hundred square miles would be realized, even if they didn't actually
believe that was a likely reality.73 Ultimately, this tactic was used by Anti-
Federalists to argue against the District Clause generally; by presenting the
dangers of an overbearing and oppressive federal government not as
hypothetical, but rather "as sober predictions," Anti-Federalists sought to
capitalize on American's fresh, painful memories of British rule.74
The third internal District Clause check was the requirement of State
cessation of any territory constituting this seat of government.
Consequently, the district's size depended completely on the states. 76 This
requirement was absolute; as Joseph Story observed, the federal government
could acquire jurisdiction over State land only through affirmative, willful
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 ("such a district ... as may, by cessation of particular States,
and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the Government of the United States"); Erbsen,
supra note 4, at 1209.
70. See, e.g., Massachusetts Convention, supra note 41, at 219 ([w]hen one member inquired
"why [the seat of government] need be ten miles square, and whether one mile square would not
be sufficient," another replied "Congress was not to exercise jurisdiction over a district of ten miles,
but one not exceeding ten miles square").
71. The Congress of the Confederation, in 1787, had vastly increased the overall size of the
United States via the Northwest Ordinance. See Northwest Territory, OHIO HISTORY CENTRAL
(July 1, 2005), http://www.ohiohistorycentral.org/entry.php?rec=772.
72. BOWLING, supra note 22, at 81 ("[o]ne hundred square miles was an enormous area to an
agrarian people who largest city, thirty-six mile Philadelphia, had a settled area of less than two
square miles").
73. Id.
74. CORNELL, supra note 9, at 121.
75. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 ("such District ... as may, by Cession of particular States,
and Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of Government of the United States").
76. See Evan Zoldan, The Permanent Seat of Government: An Unintended Consequence of
Heightened Scrutiny Under the Contract Clause, 14 J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 163, 171 (2011) ("the
United States had no right to take land that it wanted for its seat of government; rather, it was
obligated to convince the states, through bargain or otherwise, to voluntarily cede this land").
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grant. U.S. courts would confirm this understanding, establishing clear
precedent that federal jurisdiction arises only when a State formally elects to
voluntarily give land to the national government.7 8  As the power and
influence of individual states would be most affected by an increasingly
powerful federal government, the Anti-Federalists felt reassured that the size
of the district would remain regulated.79
Fourthly, the Clause did not specify what kind of city would emerge in
the district-leaving open the possibility that leading politicians would push
for a small and agrarian capital.80 Many of America's most notorious
"founding fathers" hailed from traditionally rural southern states and Anti-
Federalists believed that these individuals-most prominently Virginians
George Washington, James Madison, and Thomas Jefferson-would fight to
ensure the creation of a similarly rural federal district.8 1
History supported this Anti-Federalist expectation. When the
Continental Congress was located in Philadelphia, there was a strong
sentiment that Congress needed to reside in a smaller, less commercial city. 82
Connecticut's Oliver Ellsworth "reported that it was generally agreed that
Congress should remove to a place of less expense, less avocation, and less
influence than are to be expected in a commercial and opulent city." 83 Later,
George Washington "implied, and may actually have expressed, a fear that
Congress could not maintain secrecy and autonomy in a wealthy and socially
active commercial colonial capital." 84
When the Confederation Congress was replaced with the new,
constitutionally mandated federal one, Anti-Federalists likely assumed such
provincially biased sentiments would endure.
The final Anti-Federalist means of limiting federal power via the
District Clause arose from concerns that the seat of government would be
77. Story, supra note 38, at § 1222 ("[b]ut if there has been no cession by the state of the
place, although it has been constantly occupied and used, under purchase or otherwise, by the
United States for a fort, arsenal, or other constitutional purpose, the state jurisdiction still remains
complete and perfect").
78. People v. Godfrey, 17 Johns. R. 225 (1819), in 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 235
(Doc. 17) ("the power of exclusive legislation under the 8th section of the first article of the
constitution, which is jurisdiction, is united with cession of territory, which is to be the free act of
the states").
79. BOWLING, supra note 22, at ix, 23; CORNELL, supra note 9, at 63.
80. See Federal Farmer No. 18, supra note 42, at 220 ("[i]f a federal town be necessary for
the residence of congress and the public officers, it ought to be a small one, and the government of
it fixed on republican and common law principles, carefully enumerated and established by the
constitution").
81. Scarberry, supra note 17, at 866-70.
82. Scarberry, supra note 17, at 866-70.
83. Scarberry, supra note 17, at 870-71.
84. Scarberry, supra note 17, at 869.
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uncontrollable if Congress was granted exclusive jurisdiction within that
district.85  Anti-Federalists feared the district, free from all state taxes,
jurisdictions, and laws, would become a safe harbor for fugitives, debtors,
and other malcontents seeking to escape the reach of the states. 86 Further,
exclusive congressional jurisdiction could lead to the establishment of a
large standing federal army within the district.87  If allowed, the federal
government would be free to use its exclusive power of lawmaking in the
district to enact undemocratic and despotic laws,88 potentially reestablishing
a ruling federal aristocracy beyond state supervision. 89
Yet, the extent and legal impact of the District Clause grant of exclusive
jurisdiction remained undefined and Anti-Federalists again placed their faith
in the individual states.90 Just as with the cessation requirement, Anti-
Federalists believed state judiciaries, out of pure self-preservation, would
undoubtedly limit the Constitution's exclusive grant of federal jurisdiction
within the district. 91 Massachusetts' delegate, Rufus King, exemplified this
Anti-Federalist hope when he argued that constitutional ratification could not
be done through state legislatures: "[States cannot be] expected to approve of
a document which divested them of a considerable part of their power ... the
[State] Legislatures also being to lose the most power, will also certainly be
most likely to raise objections." 92
Meanwhile, on the other side of "one of the greatest political struggles
in American history," 93 Federalists approved the District Clause because the
85. Some claimed that exclusive federal power "[departed] from every principle of freedom,
as far as the distance of the two polar stars from each other." Thomas Tredwell, New York Ratifying
Convention, 2 July 1788, in 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 225 (Doc. 7); 4 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 493, 497 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds.,
1997)
86. See William Wirt, Right to Tax Government Property, in 3 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION 236 (Doc 20); Virginia Convention, supra note 40, at 222-23.
87. See Brutus, 9th and 19th Letters, Objections to a Standing Army (parts 1 & 2), N.Y. J.,
Jan. 17 & 24, 1788.
88. See NC Convention, supra note 39, at 225; THE DEBATE OVER THE RATIFICATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at 782 (delegates feared that district inhabitants would become
"numerous and wealthy slaves ... infallibly devoted to the views of their [congressional] masters").
89. New York, Virginia, and North Carolina introduced amendments limiting exclusive
jurisdiction to internal police power and good government, but these proposals "shared the fate of
many others, whose object was to limit the exercise of power in the federal government" and were
rejected. See St. George Tucker, supra note 46.
90. Sherry, supra note 3, at 115 1-52.
91. During ratification debates, Virginian Anti-Federalist John Nicholas provided such a
limiting interpretation, arguing exclusive jurisdiction was akin to "a coat of armor intended to
protect the government in periods of danger, and not to be worn at all times for parade and show."
ESTABLISHING CONGRESS, supra note 62, at 40-41.
92. Records of the Federal Convention, in 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 648 (Doc. 2).
93. CORNELL, supra note 9, at 1.
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federal government could potentially acquire exclusive control over an
immense territory.94 The one hundred square mile allowance was absolutely
massive by eighteenth century standards 95as it could make the district
amongst the largest cities in the world-over four times the size of the British
capital at London. 96
This potential area was also far larger than had previously been
considered necessary for the federal district.97 In 1784, the Confederation
Congress passed an ordinance permitting a permanent federal seat of
government not exceeding three square miles. 98 Then, in another 1784
proposal, Congress considered a federal city along the Delaware River,
allowing between four and nine square miles. 99 Ultimately, in exchange for
the potential of a constitutionally authorized one hundred-square mile
district, Federalists gladly risked that the Federal capitol would be far
smaller, if it were established at all. 00
The District Clause also mandated exclusive federal jurisdiction over
the area comprising the seat of government.101 Again, while Federalists had
no guarantee that the federal seat would be as large as the Constitution
permitted, they were assured that, however large, the federal government
would retain exclusive power there. 102
Additionally, Federalists felt secure in their belief that although the
district remained contingent on the generosity of the states, 103 their dream
would nonetheless be realized. In fact, many Federalists believed that there
would be competition amongst the states to establish the federal district
within their borders.1 4 While Federalists feared undue influence on the
94. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
95. It remains large even by modern standards-bigger than present-day American cities like
Boston, Cincinnati, and St. Louis. See Land Area for U.S. Cities, GOVERNING, http:Ilwww.
governing.com/gov-data/census/Land-Area-for-US-Cities.html.
96. Federal Farmer No. 18, supra note 42, at 220.
97. VARNUM, JR., supra note 22, at 7; BOWLING, supra note 22, at 64-65.
98. VARNUM, JR., supra note 22, at 7.
99. BOWLING, supra note 22, at 65.
100. Federalists believed expansion-of the nation and federal government-was inevitable.
See James Madison, Location of Capital, House of Representatives, in 3 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION 228 (Doc. 10).
101. The Federalists considered exclusive jurisdiction over the seat to be absolutely essential
in transcending State influence and oppression. See Virginia Convention, supra note 40, at 223
("[h]ow could the general government be guarded from the undue influence of particular states, or
from insults, without such exclusive power?").
102. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
103. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
104. See Zoldan, supra note 76, at 171; Virginia Convention, supra note 40, at 222 ("I believe
that, whatever state may become the seat of the general government, it will become the object of
the jealousy and envy of the other states").
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federal government, they also knew that states would expect to have more
influence the closer they were to the district and thus finding states willing
to cede portions of their land could prove fairly easy. 105
Lastly, the District Clause was wholly passive in that it did not
affirmatively indicate where this "Seat of the Government of the United
States" should be located-a fact Federalists also took advantage of during
ratification debates. 106 In not naming a seat, the clause prevented alienating
states whose support might have been jeopardized if they knew the federal
government would be housed in a distant location.1 0 7 When proposals were
made to include a location in the District Clause, Pennsylvania's Governor
Morris was "apprehensive that such a clause might make enemies of Phila.
& N. York which had expectations of becoming the Seat of the Genl.
Govt."108 In securing ratification in New York, Federalists went even
further, actually using the postponement of naming the federal seat-and
thereby keeping open the implication that New York would be selected-to
effectively bribe the state convention. 109
Ultimately, while Anti-Federalists may have had grave reservations about
some aspects of the District Clause-particularly its potential massive size and
grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction-these fears were outweighed by
confidence in the clause's internal security checks against federal expansion.11 0
Federalists, meanwhile, understood the need to quickly agree to the basic tenants
of a new constitution and remained willing to risk that those checks would
effectively limit the federal district." In September 1787, the Constitution was
sent to the states for ratification. Federalists and Anti-Federalists with their
District Clause bets confidently placed, eagerly awaited the outcome of their
great political gamble.1 12
II. Compromised Reality: Creating a Seat and The Anti-
Federalist Failure
On July 9, 1790, the U.S. House of Representatives passed An Act for
Establishing the Temporary and Permanent Seat of the Government of the
105. See, e.g., Madison, supra note 100, at 226 ("those who are most adjacent to the seat of
legislation, will always possess advantages over others. An earlier knowledge of the laws; a greater
influence in enacting them; better opportunities for anticipating them, and a thousand other
circumstances, will give a superiority to those who are thus situated.").
106. See Scarberry, supra note 17, at 874-75.
107. Id.; BOWLING, supra note 22, at 75.
108. Records of the Federal Convention, in 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 218 (Doc. 2).
109. BOWLING, supra note 22, at 87-88.
110. See supra Part I(C).
111. See supra Part I(C).
112. AMAR, supra note 1, at 5-6.
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United States.113 The Residence Act realized the Constitution's discretionary
authorization to create a federal seat. 114 The Act mandated that there would
be a federal district, and thus the Anti-Federalists' first District Clause
obstacle was overcome.115
Shortly after the Residence Act was enacted, it became evident that the
Anti-Federalists' other District Clause checks against federal power would
prove equally inadequate. Since the Constitution established only that a
federal district could be created-and not where it was to be located-there
was fierce competition as each State vied for proximity to the new federal
government. 116 Ultimately, the states, like the Federalists, expected that
"Congress would 'everyday increase in consequence,' bringing wealth and
influence to the inhabitants of the city and state that hosted the
government." 1 7  Thereafter, offers were accepted from Maryland and
Virginia selling portions of their territory along the Potomac to create the
federal district. 18 Moreover, to the alarm of Anti-Federalists, the states
donated the full one-hundred square miles.1 19 In fact, not only did the State
legislatures pass resolutions ceding this territory, they even advanced
funding to assist in building district infrastructure. 120 In one fell swoop, the
second and third Anti-Federalist District Clause checks against federal
expansion were nullified. 121
After the state lands from Maryland and Virginia were formally
transferred, George Washington was given the power to decide where
exactly the new federal city would be built.122 Anti-Federalist excitement
that this development would result in a small and modest city-Washington
was, after all, born and raised in Virginia, and thus the product of a decidedly
rural southern culture-was quickly extinguished. 123  Washington chose
Major Pierre L'Enfant-a French engineer and architect who had fought in
113. VARNUM,JR., supra note 22, at 15-16.
114. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
116. Scarberry, supra note 17, at 882; Zoldan, supra note 76, at 171 ("all parts of the Union
were anxious to have the seat of government").
117. Zoldan, supra note 76, at 171.
118. Id. Like every other state, Maryland and Virginia "both succumbed to capital fever and
expressed willingness 'to make any sacrifice to obtain the capital."'
119. Id. at 173-74.
120. See THOMAS HART BENTON, ABRIDGMENT OF THE DEBATES OF CONGRESS, FROM 1789
TO 1856(1857). It is estimated that the states' donations-taking into account both the land and the
monetary contributions-amounted to over a million dollars. Id. at 332-33.
121. See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
122. See Tindall, supra note 68, at 12.
123. BOWLING, supra note 22, at 106-13.
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the Revolutionary War-to design the city. 124 L'Enfant's designs indicated
a grand and expansive vision; his plans called for the construction of the
largest city in North America-over 6,000 acres capable of accommodating
nearly 800,000 residents. 12 5
Washington's ambitions for a large and commercial district were
supported by two of the most influential politicians of the time, James
Madison and Thomas Jefferson, both hailing from the agrarian traditions of
Virginia. 126 Initially, Washington, Madison, and Jefferson worked together
in securing the federal district on the Potomac River-infamously known as
the Compromise of 1790. Northern states accepted a southern capital in
exchange for assumption of all Revolutionary War debt by the federal
government, to be borne equally by the newly united states. 127
Anti-Federalists believed these preeminent southern leaders had
obtained a Potomac district in order to protect the agrarian traditions of their
native Virginia. 128 After the southern location was announced, Pennsylvania
Senator William Maclay, a staunch agrarian supporter, "'hope[d] that the
decision to go to the Potomac might give a preponderance to agriculture in
the dire contest he foresaw between the two economic philosophies,'
[agrarianism and commercial capitalism]." 29 Maclay, and the Anti-
Federalists, were in a way right-state interests did motivate Washington,
Madison, and Jefferson; unfortunately, it was not the Anti-Federalist interest
of State over federal sovereignty:
Although Virginians, particularly those associated with the economic
promotion of the Potomac River, often spoke for the South in
Congress, they were not typically southern. Strongly influenced by
the commercial ethos of the Middle States, particularly the
Chesapeake world, they did not oppose commercial capitalism. They
just opposed its profits going north. Consequently, they dreamed of a
Potomac capital which would not only strengthen southern political
power, but also establish Virginia as a commercial state perhaps
without rival in the Union. The capital they envisioned would serve
the American Empire as both its preeminent political and commercial
center as it spread westward to the Pacific. For this dream of uniting
124. Creating the United States: New Federal Capital City in the District of Columbia, LIBR. OF
CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/creating-the-united-states/forging-a-federal-govemment.html.
125. See Scarberry, supra note 17, at 884.
126. See Scarberry, supra note 17, at 866-70.
127. Zoldan, supra note 76, at 170-71.
128. Scarberry, supra note 17, at 867-68.
129. BOWLING, supra note 22, at x.
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The Hague and Amsterdam into one city, promoters of a Potomac
capital abandoned agrarianism . 130
Washington, Madison, and Jefferson were ultimately concerned with
their state's interests. They felt that the proximity of a powerful, influential
federal district along the Potomac to Virginia would best secure their
provincial interests while concurrently allowing the new federal government
to maximize its significance in the emerging American nation.
Anti-Federalist conflation of individual State interests with the desire
to limit federal power had similarly hampered their cause during the
ratification debates. In those debates, it was widely argued that "it to be the
general sense of America, that neither the Seat of a State Government, nor
any large commercial City should be the seat of the General Government."1 31
The fatal Anti-Federalist mistake was in assuming these delegates were
arguing against the seat being in a large and commercial city; In reality,
however, they meant only that the federal district shouldn't be located in a
preexisting, state-controlled, commercial city. 132  In the end, these
developments further undercut Anti-Federalist hopes for a small, limited,
and substantially agrarian federal district, thus negating their fourth District
Clause security measure. 133
As the district grew rapidly and swelled in population and commercial
activity,134 Anti-Federalists had only one last way the District Clause might
slow this expanding federal juggernaut-the hope that state and federal courts
would limit Congress' grant of exclusive jurisdiction. 135 In the years shortly
following the creation of the district, there were several opportunities for
courts to limit the clause's grant of exclusive congressional jurisdiction within
the federal seat. However, State courts remained hesitant to question this grant
of exclusive jurisdiction and instead affirmed the existence of extensive
federal powers. 136 First, in 1811, a Massachusetts court determined that it
lacked any jurisdiction over an offense perpetrated on land ceded to the United
130. BOWLING, supra note 22, at x-xi.
131. DEBATES, supra note 23, at 332.
132. Records of the Federal Convention, supra note 108, at 218 (many delegates argued
"neither the Seat of a State Govt. nor any large commercial City should be the seat of the Genl.
Govt.").
133. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
134. Though the district did not become a hub of commercial enterprise overnight, it was
evident from the outset that this was the intent. BEEMAN, supra note 50, at 418-19.
135. See supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Clary, 8 Mass. 72 (1811), in 3 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION 231 (Doc. 14); Custis v. Lane, 3 Munf. 579 (Va. 1813), in 3 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION 232 (Doc. 15).
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States government as a military arsenal. 137 The court specifically held that
states, in the absence of express congressional decree, have no jurisdictional
power on federal soil.138  Then, in 1813, a Virginia court was even more
definitive, declaring a federal district resident "expatriated thereby from the
government of Virginia."1 39
Accordingly, the court continued:
That he is no longer within the jurisdiction of the commonwealth of
Virginia, is manifest from this consideration, that congress are vested,
by the constitution, with exclusive power of legislation over the
territory in question; and it is only by the consent and courtesy of
congress that any of the laws of Virginia have been permitted to
operate therein. 140
Likewise, federal courts, instead of considering exclusive congressional
jurisdiction a threat to their own judicial prerogative, refused to narrow the
scope of federal power within this new seat of government. 14 1 In an 1805 case,
the Supreme Court did not dispute an appellant's argument that Congress
retains absolute jurisdiction when legislating within the federal district. 142
Then, in 1819, Justice Story affirmed that only Congress had jurisdiction over
activities on federal territory and "by the very terms of the constitution ...
state jurisdiction is completely ousted."1 43  Further, Story continued, the
District Clause grant of exclusive federal authority in the seat "was manifestly
the avowed intention of those wise and great men who framed the
constitution."1 44  The following year, the Court continued their liberal
interpretation of exclusive federal jurisdiction, ruling that Congress had
undeniable power to tax district residents for any purpose whatsoever. 145
Yet, the most devastating blow to the Anti-Federalists' final District
Clause check against federal power came in an 1821 opinion by Supreme
137. Clary, 8 Mass. at 76-77.
138. Clary, 8 Mass. at 76 (in "the territory of the United States ... congress have the exclusive
power of legislation").
139. Custis, 3 Munf. at 591.
140. Custis, 3 Munf. at 591.
141. See, e.g., United States v. More, 3 CRANCH 159 (1805), in 3 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION 382 (Doc. 8) ("When legislating over the District of Columbia, congress are bound
by no constitution"); United States v. Cornell, 25 Fed. Cas. 646 No. 14,867 (C.C.D.R.I. 1819), in
3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 233 (Doc. 16).
142. United States v. More, 3 CRANCH 159 (1805).
143. Cornell, 25 Fed. Cas. 646 No. 14, 867 (C.C.D.R.I. 1819).
144. Id.
145. Loughborough v. Blake, 5 WHEAT. 317 (1820), in 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 363
(Doc. 16).
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Court Chief Justice John Marshall. 146 Marshall held that exclusive federal
jurisdiction extended beyond the seat of government and the Constitution
generally granted the U.S. Supreme Court jurisdictional supremacy over all
state court decisions implicating or conflicting with the Constitution: "The
constitution and laws of a State, so far as they are repugnant to the constitution
and laws of the United States, are absolutely void. These states are constituent
parts of the United States. They are members of one great empire-for some
purposes sovereign, for some purposes subordinate."147
Marshall, to Anti-Federalists' horror, had used the District Clause grant
of exclusive jurisdiction to assert the far more sweeping proposition of
federal supremacy over individual State sovereignty.
Ultimately, the willingness of both state and federal courts to broadly
interpret exclusive federal jurisdiction cemented Anti-Federalist failure to
use the District Clause as a means of limiting federal government power.
While the District Clause may have represented the final wager of an
unsustainable Anti-Federalist ideology, 148 it would also emerge as one of the
great ironic failures of democratic principles in America. A bipartisan failing
of Anti-Federalists and Federalists alike, the resulting District Clause capital
remains "an undemocratic anomaly"-the district does not, to this day, have
representation in the very government it houses. 149
III. Consequences of the Compromise: District
Disenfranchisement
The U.S. Constitution's District Clause created a seat of government to
serve as the shining epicenter of the new American nation, the beating heart of
a bold political experiment resting squarely on principles of democratic
representation. Congress' exclusive jurisdiction inherently prevents local
governance and, since the district is not a state, its residents have no
representation in either Congress or the Senate.150 Perhaps most disturbingly,
146. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821), in 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 326-39
(Doc. 74).
147. Cohens, 19 U.S. 264 (1821).
148. A key political ideology during the constitutional convention and ratification, Anti-
Federalism did not emerge as a sustainable political party following adoption of the Constitution.
CORNELL, supra note 9, at 1.
149. Kate Masur, Opinion, Capital Injustice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2011, at A31.
150. District residents do elect a single, but non-voting, congressional delegate. See Raskin,
supra note 14, at 48. Larry Mirel & Joe Sternlieb, ". . . Chosen by the People of the Several States
. . . . ": Statehood for the District of Columbia, 23 Wm. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 1-2 (2014); Perry,
supra note 4, at 14.
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this blatant disenfranchisement of the nation's capital is a problem about which
a majority of American citizens remain completely unaware.151
A. The Current State of Affairs: Home Rule and the Statehood Argument
The issue of representation in the federal district did not actually arise
until the U.S. government formally began operations in 1800.152 Until that
time, residents remained subject to the laws of, and enjoyed representation
in, the states that had ceded the district's lands. 153  When the federal
government took control over the district and dissolved those temporary state
allegiances, residents were formally disenfranchised. 154
In place of federal representation, the concept of "home rule" gradually
developed as a means of allowing limited local governance-overseen by
Congress-to district residents.155  Initially, this meant that a mayor and
elected council served as the local authority, and there was almost no federal
involvement in district affairs. 156 However, in 1871 and 1874, Congress
passed legislative acts significantly altering the district's governance
structure. 157 Together, these acts expressly permitted federal repeal of any
local legislation and replaced the elected district council with federally
appointed commissioners. 15
A century later, under the 1973 Home Rule Act, residents were again
allowed to appoint a local council capable of regional governance and
regulatory lawmaking. 159 However, all council decisions remained subject
to congressional approval and the Act continued to allow Congress to veto
any district legislation. 160 This congressional oversight has not proven a
simple formality; rather, Congress has used this power to dictate district
policy on several divisive issues, such as conditions of municipal
employment, required HIV testing for insurance coverage, public funding
151. According to a research poll published in 2000, 56% of surveyed Americans believe that
District residents have the same federal representation rights as other U.S. citizens. See Mark David
Richards, U.S. Public Opinion on Political Equality for Citizens of the District of Columbia, DC
WATCH, Apr. 12, 2000, http://www.dcwatch.com/richards/000412.htm. That unawareness appears
likely to grow. According to the same poll, a staggering 70% of young American voters (aged 21-
34) are not aware that District residents lack federal representation. Id.
152. Boyd, supra note 14, at 590-91.
153. Id.
154. Samuel B. Johnson, The District of Columbia and the Republican Form of Government
Guarantee, 37 HOWARD L.J. 333, 338 (1993-94); Raven-Hansen, supra note 14, at 175.
155. Johnson, supra note 154, at 335.
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for abortions, and prohibitions against sexual discrimination. 161 Most
importantly, all district funding, including its annual budget and tax policies,
must be approved by Congress. 162 In the end, home rule allows the appearance
of local governance, but is little more than a fagade, underscoring the purely
federal authority that ultimately dictates district bureaucracy.
Widespread local dissatisfaction with home rule has resulted in near-
continual calls for reform. 163 While a variety of proposals have emerged
over the years, 164 the most enduring has been the argument that the federal
district should be granted statehood. 165 While this solution has the benefit of
immediately resolving the issue of federal representation-as a state, D.C.
would immediately become entitled to two senators and congressional
representatives in proportion to their population 166 it has also met with
severe criticism from both ends of the political spectrum.167
Advocates of D.C. statehood have long argued that it is the only means
of ensuring true, legitimate representation of district residents. 168 The idea
that the nation's capital might become a formal state was initially broached
by a 1978 proposed constitutional amendment, which, though not granting
161. Johnson, supra note 154, at 335, 338-40.
162. Id. at 339-40.
163. Since the institution of the current Home Rule system, there have been more than 150
resolutions introduced and over twenty congressional hearings convened to consider representation
for the nation's capital. See U.S. Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Should the Capital Vote in Congress? A
Critical Analysis of the Proposed D.C. Representation Amendment, 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 470,
495-96 (1979).
164. These include, among others: retrocession of the district to Maryland, quasi-retrocession
allowing district residents to vote in Maryland federal elections, constitutional amendment granting
federal voting rights, and legislation granting the district federal representation. See Boyd, supra
note 14; Mirel & Sternlieb, supra note 150, at 2-3; Raskin, supra note 14.
165. See generally Johnny Barnes, Towards Equal Footing: Responding to Perceived
Constitutional, Legal and Practical Impediments to Statehood for the District of Columbia, 13
UDC/DCSL L. REv. 1 (2010); Mirel & Sternlieb, supra note 150; Jamin B. Raskin, Domination,
Democracy, and the District: The Statehood Position, 39 CATH. U. L. REv. 417 (1990).
166. Under the accepted "Equal Footing Doctrine," newly admitted states are immediately
entitled to "the same power, dignity, and authority of every other state," including, of course, full
representation in the House of Representatives and the Senate. See Mary M. Cheh, Theories of
Representation: For the District of Columbia, Only Statehood Will Do, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 65, 69-70 (2014); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (The House of Representatives shall be
comprised of members selected "by the People of the several States"); U.S. CONST. amend. XVII
(The Senate is formed of two representatives "from each State, elected by the people thereof");
Barnes, supra note 165, at 4-5; Coye v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567-69 (1911).
167. Mirel & Sternlieb, supra note 150, at 4-5 (noting that both Republicans and Democrats
have legitimate concerns over the admission of the district as the fifty-first State).
168. See Raskin, supra note 165, at 423 (concluding that in order to secure true political
equality with other American citizens, district residents "must escape the geographic and political
boundaries of the District of Columbia and form their own State"); Cheh, supra note 166, at 66
("the only complete legal and moral remedy for the District's political subjugation is statehood").
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full-fledged statehood status, would have granted the district full federal
voting rights while maintaining its status as the seat of national
government. 169 The amendment was passed by Congress and sent to the
individual states for ratification, where it would neglectfully linger and
unceremoniously die after garnering only sixteen approvals in seven years. 170
After this abject failure to provide full district representation in the federal
government, the push for unreserved statehood was renewed in 1993 when
D.C.'s nonvoting congressional delegate, Eleanor Holmes Norton,
sponsored legislation seeking to make the district the fifty-first U.S. State. 171
Again, the drive for district statehood was soundly rejected; the New
Columbia Admission Act failed in Congress by a decisive 153-277
margin.172 In 2007, some semblance of bipartisan middle ground emerged
in the form of the District of Columbia House Voting Rights Act. 173 The
Act, allowing district representation in the House of Representatives, but not
the Senate, ultimately failed to garner sufficient support to become law. 174
Despite this legacy of failure, supporters of D.C. statehood remain
undeterred. In 2016, amidst reports of all-time high support for statehood
within the district,175 D.C. Mayor Muriel Bowser advocated a district-wide
referendum on statehood. 176 Shortly thereafter, the district council released
a proposed State constitution to guide New Columbia.177 Notwithstanding
this continued optimism, it remains unlikely that such local movements will
acquire the national backing needed to realize statehood for the district.
169. R. Hewitt Pate, D.C. Statehood: Not Without A Constitutional Amendment, THE
HERITAGE LECTURES, No. 461, 1993, at 1, 2-3; Turley, supra note 31, at 309.
170. Pate, supra note 169, at 2.
171. Turley, supra note 31, at 309.
172. New Columbia Admission Act, H.R. 51, 103d Cong. (1993).
173. District of Columbia House Voting Rights Act of 2007, H.R. 1433, 110th Cong. (2007).
174. Cheh, supra note 166, at 86-87.
175. See Nina Golgowski, D.C. Votes to Become the 51st State, But It Likely Won't,
HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 9, 2016, https://www.huffingtonpost.comlentry/dc-votes-to-become-
stateus_58235f06e4b0e80b02ce689e (reporting that 79% of D.C residents voted for statehood in
a local referendum); Abigail Hauslohner, Support for D.C. Statehood at Record High, WASH. POST
(Nov. 23, 2015) https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/support-for-dc-state hood-at-
record-high/2015/11/22/29e80132-8ee5-11e5-aelf-af46b7df8483_story.html (according to a
Washington Post poll, 67% of district respondents favored statehood for the district).
176. Martin Austermuhle, Mayor Wants Statehood Vote This Year by D.C Residents,
AMERICAN U. RADIO (Apr. 15, 2016) https://wamu.org/story/16/04/15/mayor-bowserwants
vote-on-statehood for dc/.
177. Aaron C. Davis, Draft Constitution for 51" American State Would Let Almost Anyone Be
Governor of D.C., WASH. POST, May 6, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-
politics/draft-constitution-for-51 st-american-state-would-let-almost-anyone-be-govemor-of-
dc/2016/05/06/97cf0422-1395-11e6-81b4-58la5c4c42df story.html; Jen Kinney, Welcome, New
Columbia? D.C. Drafts 51st State Constitution, NEXT CITY, May 9, 2016, https://nextcity.org/
daily/entry/welcome-new-columbia-dc-mayor-releases-draft-constitution-dc-5 1st-state.
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Ultimately, while Republicans oppose the creation of new, Democrat-favoring
congressional seats that would accompany D.C. statehood,1 7 8 Democrats have
proven equally disinterested in securing a fifty-first State.179 Further, legal
scholars from both camps continually question whether, and how, D.C.
statehood could be constitutionally achieved.180  Consequently, district
statehood has long remained little more than a bargaining chip used by both
national political parties to advance their agendas. 81
178. See Peter Moore, Half Oppose Statehood for Washington, D.C., YOUGov, Sept. 22, 2014,
https://today.yougov.com/news/2014/09/22/half-oppose-statehood-dc/ (reporting that, in the 2012
presidential election, over 90% of D.C. voters supported the Democrat candidate). The undeniably
legitimate influence of this political balance of power shift was evident in the failure of the 2007
D.C. Voting Act. See Cheh, supra note 166, at 86. In an attempt to maintain this balance, the Act
included a rider that also added a congressional seat to the highly Republican-leaning Utah. Id.
When it was determined that the addition of congressional representatives to preexisting states was
unconstitutional, the bill fell apart in the Senate. Id.
179. While the Democratic Party has repeatedly endorsed the idea of district statehood, it has
failed to take real action on the issue. See Mark Plotkin, Democrats Are All Talk When It Comes
to DC Statehood, THE HLL, Nov. 24, 2017, http://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/361457-
democrats-all-are-talk-when-it-comes-to-dc-statehood (observing that in both 1993 and 2009,
Democrats voiced support for district statehood, controlled both houses of Congress and the
Presidency, and still failed to take any meaningful steps towards legitimate representation in D.C.).
In 2012, Independent Joe Lieberman and a trio of Democrat Senators sponsored a bill seeking D.C.
statehood. Arn Greenwood, D.C. Statehood: Senate Bill by Joe Lieberman Would Make 'New
Columbia' 51st State, HUFF. POST, Dec. 19, 2012, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/19/
dc-statehood-senate-lieberman-new-columbia-_n_2334077.html. However, the gesture was
widely seen as purely symbolic; the bill was introduced with only two weeks remaining in the
Congress and Lieberman set to retire. Id.
Similarly, in 2014, Democrats again voiced support for district representation and
sponsored another bill granting D.C. statehood. Aaron C. Davis, Congress Takes up Bill to Make
D.C. the 51st State, WASH. POST (Sept. 15, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-
politics/congress-takes-up-bill-to-make-dc-the-5 1st-state/2014/09/15/1 89a499a-3cd3-11e4-9587-
5dafd96295f0_story.html. Again, however, their dedication to the district cause seemed insincere.
Id. Despite their vocal enthusiasm, only one Democrat actually showed up to the hearing on the
bill-Thomas Carper, the one who introduced the bill. Id. Meanwhile, many questioned why the
president, again a Democrat that had stated his full support for district statehood, failed to send any
representatives. Id. Further, some Republican attendees questioned whether the timing of the bill,
weeks before midterm elections, was just an attempt to sway district voters. Id.
180. Numerous scholars, as well as Democrat and Republican-led justice departments alike,
have warned that D.C. statehood by mere congressional legislation would be facially
unconstitutional. See Pate, supra note 169; Turley, supra note 31; Lawrence M. Frankel, National
Representation for the District of Columbia: A Legislative Solution, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1659, 1673,
1676 (1991).
181. See, e.g., Cheh, supra note 166, at 66 (describing "the propensity of members of Congress
to use the District as a political plaything"); Paul Kane, Perry Bacon Jr. & David A. Fahrenthold,
Budget Battle Came Down to 3 Men and Their Weaknesses, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2011,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/budget-battle-came-down-to-3-men-and-their-weaknesses
/2011/04/09/AFLotbAD-story.html (in 2012, President Obama used D.C. abortion funding as a
bargaining chip with Republicans in seeking to avoid a government shutdown); see supra note 180
and accompanying text (discussing how bills in support of district statehood have often been
introduced suspiciously close to election periods); Byron C. Tau, How the Gun Lobby Shot Down
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Regardless of whether D.C. statehood is a realistic goal-disregarding
whether it is advisable 82 or even constitutionally permissiblel 83-the fact
remains that a large segment of American citizens are federally
disenfranchised solely on the basis of geographic misfortune. 184 However,
it seems that the question of how to allow for federal government
representation in D.C is best resolved by looking directly at the Constitution
responsible for its creation in the first place. In considering the initial
intentions of the Constitution, and those responsible for drafting it, we may
be able to determine the most appropriate means of addressing this decidedly
untenable present situation.
B. Original Intent: The Founders and District Representation
Many commentators have argued that the current lack of representation
in America's capital is more than ironic, 185 or even unjust; 186 further, they
claim, it is contrary to the intention of America's Founders.187 In concluding
the district's lack of representation violates the Constitution's Republican
Form of Government Guarantee, Samuel B. Johnson alleges "the majority of
the framers . . . expected the implementation of self-government for the
District."18 8 Indeed, records from the founding support this position: In
Federalist No. 43, Madison remarked that "a municipal legislature for local
purposes, derived from their own suffrages, will of course be allowed" to
D.C's Congressional Vote, WASH. CITY PAPER (June 4, 2010), https://www.washingtoncitypaper.
com/news/article/13038940/how-the-gun-lobby-shot-down-ds-congressional-vote (2009 district
statehood bill was rejected after Republicans added several riders relating to D.C.'s gun laws).
182. Many have argued that D.C. is not economically viable as a state because of its non-
existent local economy, completely urban nature, and the large federal stipend granted annually to
the district as the national government host. As one commentator succinctly put it, "the District is
a company town, and that company is the federal government." See Pate, supra note 169, at 8-9.
See also Hatch, supra note 163, at 519, 525-25, 534; David Schleicher, Welcome to New Columbia:
The Fiscal, Economic and Political Consequences of Statehood for D.C., 23 WM. & MARY BLL
RTS. J. 89, 91, 97 (2014). But see Cheh, supra note 166, at 71-72 (arguing that "the District is not
too financially dependent on the federal government and would be able to stand on its own as a
state").
183. See sources cited supra note 181.
184. Some commentators even feel that the district should be considered a "colony" comprised
of "second class citizens" in a worse position than those living in American territories, for whom
there is at least an established, if onerous, path to statehood and full federal government
representation. See Cheh, supra note 166, at 71-72; Raskin, supra note 165, at 417-18.
185. Raven-Hansen, supra note 14, at 167.
186. CHARLES WESLEY HARRIS, CONGRESS AND THE GOVERNANCE OF THE NATION'S
CAPITAL (1995) (lack of representation "violates basic democratic principles and the rights of the
capital's inhabitants").
187. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 154, at 357-58, 388.
188. Johnson, supra note 154, at 358.
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district residents. 189 Similarly, Joseph Story stated that the District Clause
"without any constitutional scruple, or surmise of doubt" permitted a local
government. 190
Meanwhile, others assert with equally persuasive historical evidence
that the constitutional failure to provide for district representation is a
consequence of mere inadvertence. 19 1 At the founding, they argue, the
protection and interests of the new federal government simply overshadowed
any consideration of the representative rights of those eventually residing
within the district.1 92 This interpretation of the Founders' intent, or lack
thereof, was endorsed by Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson in the 1949
Tidewater Transfer case, where he noted "there is no evidence that the
Founders, pressed by more general and immediate anxieties, thought of the
special problems of the District of Columbia . . .. This is not strange, for the
District was then only a contemplated entity." 93
Finally, some even contend that primary records indicate the district
was intentionally excluded from participation in the federal government.194
In an article arguing that the 1846 retrocession of district land to Virginia 95
violated the Constitution's Contract Clause, Evan Zoldan alleges, "both
Federalists and Anti-Federalists understood that residents of the new district
would not be guaranteed the right to representation under the
Constitution." 96  This was considered an acceptable and consensual
sacrifice, Zoldan says, because of the expectation that expansion of the
federal district would bring "wealth and influence to the inhabitants of the
[federal] city and state that hosted the government." 97
Eugene Boyd likewise argues that there was an immediate awareness
of the representation conundrum in the newly formed American capital.198
189. Madison, supra note 27, at 219.
190. Story, supra note 38, at §1224.
191. Frankel, supra note 180, at 1684-86; Raven-Hansen, supra note 14, at 184-91; Tindall,
supra note 68, at 178, 184 ("disenfranchisement . . . was unintended by both the constitutional
framers and the parties to the cessation legislation").
192. Frankel, supra note 180, at 1685-87; Johnson, supra note 154, at 357, 387-88; Raven-
Hansen, supra note 14, at 178, 184, 191.
193. National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 587 (1949).
194. See generally Zoldan, supra note 76; BOWLING, supra note 22, at 85-87.
195. Congress receded to Virginia the county of Alexandria after its residents requested to
return to their native state. Tindall, supra note 68, at 19-20. Although disenfranchisement was
initially cited as a primary reason for the retrocession, it is now generally agreed that the purely
parochial economic interests of Virginia's most prominent merchant class was at the core of the
retrocession movement. See Zoldan, supra note 76, at 178-79.
196. Zoldan, supra note 76, at 172.
197. Zoldan, supra note 76, at 171.
198. Boyd, supra note 14, at 597-99.
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As early as 1804, Boyd notes, disenfranchisement concerns spurred various
resolutions that would have returned parts of the district to their original
states.1 99  However, these proposals were rejected because district
disenfranchisement was considered less important than "efforts to create an
independent and freestanding federal territory as the seat of the national
government."2 00 Ultimately, these scholars maintain, the "Framers left no
doubt that they were subjecting the people of the federal district to Congress'
legislative power without representation. "201
In 1820, the Supreme Court supported the idea that the Constitution
intentionally disenfranchised the district.202 In holding that Congress
retained absolute constitutional authority to tax district residents, Chief
Justice John Marshall stated that in the Constitution "[r]epresentation is not
made the foundation of taxation" and although "in theory it might be more
congenial to the spirit of our institutions to admit a representative from the
district . . . certainly the constitution does not consider their want of a
representative in Congress as exempting it from equal taxation. "203
C. Constitutional Evolution: The Time for Change
Regardless of the Founders' intentions for the federal district, the time
has come to formally recognize and allow representation in the U.S.
capital.204 While the District of Columbia "bears the proud title of the
Capitol of the greatest Democracy on earth .. . how hollow is the sound of
political liberty to the disenfranchised inhabitants living in the very shadow
of the dome of the Capitol !",205 Ultimately, America was founded after a
revolution sparked by disenfranchisement and U.S. political tradition has
since demanded that its Constitution "resolve ambiguities in favor of the
'fundamental principle of [its] representative democracy. "'206
199. Boyd, supra note 14, at 598; see also BOWLING, supra note 22, at 86.
200. Boyd, supra note 14, at 598.
201. Zoldan, supra note 76, at 173.
202. See Loughborough v. Blake, 18 U.S. 317 (1820).
203. Blake, 18 U.S. at 320, 324.
204. Perry, supra note 4, at 15 (arguing that regardless of constitutional intent, the justification
for exclusive federal jurisdiction in the district-namely, protection and security of the federal
government-is not applicable today); see also Turley, supra note 31, at 314-15 (arguing that the
Federal government is now vastly more powerful than at the time of the founding, and,
consequently, the "original motivating purposes behind the creation of the federal enclave ... are
no longer compelling.").
205. Perry, supra note 4, at 13.
206. Raven-Hansen, supra note 14, at 187.
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Although a number of proposals for district representation have
emerged,207 the Constitution provides an express mechanism for addressing
this issue: the amendment process. The amendment procedure has, in fact,
already been used to provide district residents some degree of participation in
national government-in 1961, the Twenty-Third Amendment was ratified,
allowing the district three Electoral College votes in presidential elections.208
Further, the use of a constitutional amendment to address
disenfranchisement in the district was supported at the time of the
founding. 209 In 1801, the same year that Congress formally assumed district
residence, Augustus Woodward, a prominent landowner, member of the
original federal city council, and prot6g6 of Thomas Jefferson, released
pamphlets espousing exactly such an amendment.2 10 In 1978, a proposed
amendment, allowing district representatives in all branches of federal
government, passed both Congress and the Senate, but ultimately failed
ratification in the states.211
While a constitutional amendment might not be required to allow
district residents federal representation, it remains preferable simply because
it is the mechanism specifically envisioned by the Founders to allow
America's most important political document to develop over time.212 Also,
the issue of federal representation for the district is a fundamentally
American democratic concern; accordingly, it is a problem shared by all
Americans and any solution should similarly be borne by the entire nation.
The amendment course accomplishes this admittedly ideological goal by
requiring approval of the American people, through ratification in a
supermajority of the states.2 13
Ultimately, the amendment process is the means by which America's
Founders allowed the Constitution to evolve and grow. In the years
207. See generally Raskin, supra note 14; HARRIS, supra note 186; Boyd, supra note 14; see
also supra Part III(A).
208. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII.
209. Boyd, supra note 14, at 593-95.
210. AUGUSTUS BREVOORT WOODWARD, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
TERRITORY OF COLUMBIA: As THEY RECENTLY APPEARED IN THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER,
UNDER THE SIGNATURE OF EPAMINONDAS, PAPER No. 1 OF 1801 (Washington D.C., Samuel
Harrison Smith 1801).
211. Boyd, supra note 14, at 596.
212. See Tindall, supra note 68, at 23-25 (arguing "state" in the Constitution should be
understood as including the district for purposes of representation); see also Perry, supra note 4, at
26-27 (arguing Congress has independent authority to make the district a state).
213. See U.S. CONST. art. V (amendments must be ratified by three-quarters of the states); see
also Pate, supra note 169, at 9 ("[t]he people of the fifty states, through their state legislatures, must
have their say on this fundamental change to our national capital and the Constitution that created it.").
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immediately following ratification, Justice Marshall discussed the
Constitution's need to mature over time:
But a constitution is framed for ages to come . . . [i]ts course cannot
always be tranquil. It is exposed to storms and tempests, and its
framers must be unwise statesmen indeed if they have not provided it,
as far as its nature will permit, with the means of self-preservation
from the perils it may be destined to encounter. 214
The American Founders were wise statesmen indeed; their
Constitution, through the amendment process, specifically accounts for
Marshall's storms and tempests, permitting for that all-important political
self-preservation. Now, the time has come for America to yet again utilize
this mechanism of constitutional evolution and provide federal
representation to residents of the United States capital.
Conclusion
The U.S. Constitution's District Clause specifically restricts the
American seat of government to no more than "ten Miles square." 2 15 This
wholly overlooked constitutional language was not accidental or random. It
was part of a critical compromise between two political factions-
Federalists and Anti-Federalists-whose ideologies drove the creation and
ratification of that Constitution.216
Ultimately, the District Clause was a gamble by both sides of the
constitutional debate; Federalists risked the discretionary nature and various
internal limitations against the possibility of a large and expansive federal
seat. 217 Meanwhile, Anti-Federalists believed the clause contained sufficient
internal checks adequately restraining the potentially limitless powers
entrusted to this new national government.218 In the end, it was a gamble the
Federalists decidedly won. 219 Before long, the clause led to the creation of a
massive federal district donated by willing states, the establishment of a
federal city as a commercial epicenterby southern political leaders, and the
determination by the nation's courts that the constitutional grant of exclusive
federal jurisdiction within the district was essentially unlimited.220
214. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 387 (1821).
215. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
216. See supra Part I.
217. See supra Part I(C).
218. See supra Part I(C).
219. See supra Part II.
220. See supra Part II.
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Yet, perhaps the most important consequence of the District Clause is
one that continues to perplex modern-day America.221 In creating a federal
seat independent of individual states while concurrently granting exclusive
congressional jurisdiction within that district, the clause created a "unique
and startling" situation wherein district residents lack the democratic
representation that very government was intended to symbolize.222
Although a number of proposals addressing this disenfranchisement
have emerged, including consistent calls for district statehood, the solution
most faithful to America's Founders-and the Constitution they
conceived-is through passage of a constitutional amendment. The ability
of America's Constitution to evolve-and resolve the district representation
problem-is critically important. Thomas Jefferson understood the dangers
inherent in an unwillingness to allow for constitutional evolution; over two
hundred years ago, he provided a solemn warning-and invaluable advice-
to the future United States:
Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and
deem them like the arc of the covenant, too sacred to be touched. They
ascribe to the men of the preceding age a wisdom more than human,
and suppose what they did to be beyond amendment .... But I know
also, that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress
of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more
enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and
manners and opinions change with the changes of circumstances,
institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times. 223
If a constitution's true worth lies in its adaptability, then today America has
a rare opportunity to show that it remains worthy of the constitutional ideals on
which it was founded.224 Whether the United States will prove capable of
embracing Jefferson's words-and of concurrently evolving the Founders'
original conception of representative democracy-remains to be seen.
221. See supra Part III.
222. Raskin, supra note 14, at 48.
223. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816) (The Thomas
Jefferson Papers at the Library of Congress).
224. HELEN FENWICK & GAVIN PHLLIPSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PUBLIC LAW AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 8 (Cavendish Publishing, 2nd ed. 2003) (discussing the importance of
constitutional malleability over time).
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